Individual incentives and collective efficiency for an externality game with incomplete information
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Libro |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Louvain
Universite Catholique
1975
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