Optimal Monetary Policy and Disclosure With an Informationally-Constrained Central Banker
Aká je povaha optimálnej menovej politiky a zverejňovania informácií centrálnou bankou, keď si menová autorita nie je istá ekonomickým stavom? Úvaha o modeli, v ktorom firmy rozhodujú o nominálnych cenách a centrálna banka stanovuje nominálnu úrokovú sadzbu pri neúplných informáciách. Zistenie, že i...
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