An Examination of the Effect of Messages on Cooperation under Double-Blind and Single-Blind Payoff Procedures
Výskum zameraný na správy v rámci dvojito zaslepenej výplatnej procedúry pre otestovanie alternatívneho vysvetlenia, že dodržanie sľubu je spôsobené vonkajším vplyvom a obavami o reputáciu. Vplyv postupu vyplácania ovplyvňoval súhrnnú spoluprácu. Vplyv komunikácie na spoluprácu v experimente s postu...
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| Langue: | anglais |
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