Delegation and coordination in fiscal-monetary policy games implemantation of the best feasible equilibrium
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
San Domenico (FI)
European University Institute
2001
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| Series: | EUI Working paper ECO
No. 2001/13 |
| Subjects: | |
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