Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private information
Uložené v:
| Hlavný autor: | |
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| Ďalší autori: | |
| Médium: | Kniha |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydavateľské údaje: |
San Domenico (FI)
European University Institute
1998
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| Edícia: | EUI Working paper ECO
No. 98/34 |
| Predmet: | |
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