Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization.
Úplná charakteristika triedy korešpondencií sociálneho výberu, ktoré sú implementovateľné pri silnej Nashovej rovnováhe. Na rozdiel od starších prác sa namiesto funkcií efektivity používa variant hry v kontexte s Nashovou implementáciou.
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Autres auteurs: | |
| Format: | Chapitre de livre |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Sujets: | |
| Tags: |
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
Documents similaires: Implementation under strong equilibrium.
- Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of the subgameperfect equilibrium outcomes.
- <The> game approach to the price equilibrium existence problem in banach lattices without ordered preferences
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities.
- Computability and randomness of Nash equilibrium in finite games.
- <A> fixed point theorem and equilibrium point of an abstract economy.
- <An> existence theorem for a bargaining set.